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Recent Developments

Cartnail v. State:
A Police Officer Was Not Justified, Under Reasonable Suspicion Standard, in
Conducting an Investigative Traffic Seizure of Defendant Who Had Not Committed
a Motor Violation
By Sona Morrison
n this case, implicating the
Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that
under the reasonable suspicion
standard, police officers are not
justified in conducting investigative
traffic stops, absent specific facts
and rational inferences based on
those facts indicating criminal activity.
Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 753
A.2d 519 (2000). The court further
held that a set of wholly innocent
circumstances cannot add up to an
articulable suspicion unless they
establish an objective inference that
would lead a reasonable and prudent
officer to make the stop.
On August 26, 1997, at
approximately 1:49 a.m., the City
of Frederick police investigated a
reported robbery at the Quality Inn
hotel near the interchange of
Interstate highways 70 and 270, and
routes 15 and 340 in Frederick.
Police received information that
three black males driving a gold or
tan Mazda had fled the scene in an
unknown direction. Based on this
information, at 3:05 a.m., and
approximately two miles northeast
of the Quality Inn, the patrol officer
pulled over a gold Nissan
containing two black men,
Rondorian Wayne Cartnail
("Cartnail"), the defendant, and

I

another black male. The officer
requested Cartnail 's driver's license
and registration, and Cartnail
voluntarily admitted he was driving on
a revoked license. The officer
confirmed the revocation through a
computer check, and Cartnail was
subsequently arrested and charged
based on the information obtained
pursuant to the traffic stop.
At a motion to suppress
hearing, Cartnail moved to suppress
any statements or information
obtained after the stop, because he
had not committed a traffic
violation, and the officer did not
have reasonable articulable
suspicion of any criminal activity.
The State argued that the robbery
information
supplied
the
articulable suspicion. The motion
was denied, and the trial court
subsequently found Cartnail guilty
of driving with a revoked license.
The court of special appeals
affirmed based on the similarity of
Cartnail 's vehicle and the one
reported in the robbery, the fact that
there were multiple occupants in the
vehicle, and the fact that the stop
occurred in the early morning hours
when there are few vehicles on the
street and in the same metropolitan
area of the robbery. The court of
appeals granted certiorari to
determine whether the police stop was

lawful.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by addressing the Fourth
Amendment protections against
unreasonable searches applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Cartnail v. State, 359
Md. 272, 279, 753 A.2d 519, 523
(2000) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961)). The
detention of a motorist pursuant to a
police traffic stop is a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment, and is
evaluated for reasonableness under
a dual inquiry: ''whether the stop was
justified at its inception, and whether
it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place." /d.
(quoting United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985)(citing
Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).
The court of appeals was concerned
with the first prong and questioned
whether the officer had reasonable
articulable suspicion to warrant the
intrusion. /d. (citing Ferris v. State,
355 Md. 356, 384, 735 A.2d 491,
501 (1999)). The court stated that
"reasonable suspicion . . . is
dependent upon ... the content of
information possessed by police
and its degree of reliability." /d. at
285-87, 753 A.2d at 526-527
(quoting Alabama v. White, 496
U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). Under a
31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 55
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"totality of the circumstances"
standard, both quantity and quality
of the information must be
evaluated. !d. at 287, 753 A.2d at
526-527 (citing Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).
The court next considered
factors in evaluating the totality of
circumstances. !d. at 289, 753 A.2d
528. The court found that the
universe of facts will be determined
primarily by the amount and
uniqueness of description, the size
of the area within which the offender
might be found, the length of time
since the offense, and the number
of people about at the time in that
area. !d. (citing 4 WAYNE LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(g) at 19 5,
198, n. 297 (3d ed. 1996 & 2000
Supp.)). The court found that the
details of the robbery suspects used
by the officer to make the stop did
not reasonably and articulably match
Cartnail's circumstances. !d. at 294,
753 A.2d at 531.
Finally, the court addressed the
lack of corroboration between the
description of the robbery suspects
and the circumstances surrounding
Cartnail at the time of the stop. !d.
at 290, 753 A.2d at 529. The court
noted the lack of two of the
reasonable suspicion factors. !d.
There was no traffic violation, and
Cartnail was not exhibiting
behavior out of the ordinary except
to be on the road in the early
morning hours when there are few
others on the road. !d. This was
analyzed to be "innocent travel" and
not suspicious activity that would
justify the stop. !d. The second
factor lacking was the absence of

31.1 U. Bait L.F. 56

any knowledge that Cartnail had
been involved in other unrelated
criminal activity of a similar nature.
!d.
Stating that a driver is entitled
to privacy at any time of the day,
the court found that the only factors
present that matched Cartnail 's
"circumstances were gender, race
and arguably the color of the car."
!d. at 293,296,753 A.2d at 53132. The court rejected the State's
claim that the makes of the vehicles
involved in the crime, Mazda, and
Cartnail 's Nissan, sufficiently
narrowed "the group of innocent
travelers." !d. at 294, 753 A.2d at
531. In addition, the court stressed
the importance of considering the
elapsed time and distance from the
stop to the crime. !d. at 295, 753
A.2d at 532. The court reasoned
that considering the total picture,
including the number of major
highways in the vicinity of the
crime, the "range of possible flight"
open to the suspects in the "hour and
fifteen minutes following the
robbery [was] relatively enormous"
including as far as Baltimore or
Washington, D.C. !d. The court
determined that a reasonable police
officer in either ofthose cities could
not have pulled over Cartnail
"under such a flimsy guise of
'reasonable suspicion."' !d.
The court also considered the
time of day as an important
consideration because it decreases
the number of innocent people on
the road and can aid the police in
spotting criminal suspects. !d. at
296, 753 A.2d 532. However, early
morning hours also provide police

more opportunity to observe a
suspected motorist before initiating
a Terry stop and that should have
been done in this case. !d.
Thus, the court concluded that
the details and description of the
robbery suspects "did not
reasonably and articulably match
[Cartnail's] circumstances" and
was an unconstitutional seizure. !d.
at 297, 753 A.2d at 532. The court
found that the "combination of
wholly innocent factors" did not
combine into a "suspicious" totality
of circumstances to support the stop
and reversed the court of special
appeals, remanding to the Circuit
Court for Frederick County. !d. at
294, 753 A.2d at 531 (citing United
States v. Wood, 106 F. 3d 942, 948
(10'h Cir. 1997)).
The court of appeals' ruling
gives "teeth to the notion ... [that]
police do not [have] carte blanche
to pick and choose whom to stop
based on some 'hunch."' !d. at 297,
753 A.2d at 532. In determining that
a combination of"wholly innocent
factors" is no more suspicious than
the individual components, the court
is providing law enforcement
officials with a clear directive that
articulably suspicious behavior
must be present in order to make an
investigative stop. !d. This
decision speaks loudly that
Maryland
is
aggressively
preserving the Constitutional rights
of its citizens, specifically the
Fourth Amendment right against
unlawful search and seizures, and
will not permit random stops based
on little more than an over
enthusiastic inclination.

